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Who is an Employer Under WARN in the Arena of
Creditor-Debtor Relationships?
C. Maxwell Rizzo*
"Every day workers are losing their jobs with little or no notice,. .
Advance notice is the fair thing to do, and it is the pragmatic thing
to do. . . . [O]ver 10 million Americans . . . have lost their jobs over
the period of the last 6 years, 40,000 factories that have closed, two-
thirds of them without any kind of notification whatsoever. We are
talking about families, . . . husbands, wives, and children, whose
lives will be bettered by this piece of legislation."'
I. INTRODUCTION
When large businesses shut down or plants institute mass layoffs, it
can throw a wrench into the economy of a community. To help com-
munities deal with these happenings and adjust to these conditions,
Congress enacted the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act ("WARN") in 1988.2 In general, WARN is a United States labor
law that protects employees, their families, and communities by re-
quiring most employers with 100 or more employees to provide sixty
days' advance written notification of plant closings and mass layoffs of
employees.3 The purpose of WARN is to protect these workers, their
families, and communities "by providing notice so that workers who
will be terminated may seek other jobs or retraining."4 The advance
notice gives workers and their families' transition time to adjust to the
prospective loss of employment, to seek and obtain other employ-
ment, and, if necessary, to enter skill-training programs that will allow
these workers to successfully compete in the job market.
Coppola v. Bear Stearns is an important decision under WARN ad-
dressing whether a creditor can become an employer.5 In Coppola, a
debtor of Bear Stearns closed its doors without giving sixty days' ad-
* J.D., DePaul University College of Law, 2010; B.A., Economics, University of Texas, 2007
1. 134 CONG. REC. S8374 , at 7 (daily ed. June 22, 1988) (statements of Sen. Kennedy discuss-
ing the need for the enactment of the WARN Act).
2. See Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (2000).
3. See id. § 2102.
4. See Halkias v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 955 F. Supp. 695, 698 (N.D. Tex. 1997); see also Grim-
mer v. Lord Day & Lord, 937 F. Supp. 255, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
5. Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., 499 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2007).
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vanced notice (as required under WARN), and a subsequent class ac-
tion suit was filed against the creditor, Bear Stearns. 6 The Second
Circuit addressed the question of whether Bear Stearns was an "em-
ployer" under WARN (and thus, subject to the statute), and, in turn,
what test to apply when analyzing who qualifies as an "employer"
under WARN.7 This decision confirmed that a conflict exists between
the circuits with respect to the legal issue of who is an employer under
WARN in creditor-debtor relationships.8 Looking at the statute, the
definition of an employer is unhelpful and conclusory. This Article
will analyze WARN's language and history, discuss the present circuit
split and each test's ramifications, and, in the end, conclude as to
which test should prevail.
The first section details the circumstances surrounding WARN's en-
actment. Further, it describes the problems the Legislature identified
with the system in place prior to WARN, as well as possible solutions,
and it explains why the Legislature believed that WARN would solve
these previously-identified problems. The next section presents an
overview of the circuit split concerning the meaning of the word "em-
ployer" under WARN and the tests used to determine who is an em-
ployer in the context of a creditor-debtor relationship. This section
briefly contrasts the majority view employed by the Second, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits with the minority view used by the Third Circuit.
The following section provides necessary background of lender liabil-
ity. This background is helpful because the majority test is based, in
part, on these principles in order to determine whether a creditor is an
employer and thus, subject to liability under WARN. The final two
sections dive into a more specific analysis of the circuit split. These
sections discuss the majority and minority tests, illustrating the bene-
fits and detriments of each. After analyzing the tests in greater detail,
the sections demonstrate why the majority test is better tailored to
meet the requirements and purposes of WARN. Further, the majority
test provides the creditors with predictability; this predictability will
likely induce creditors to save capital-starved businesses.
6. Id. at 147-48.
7. Id. at 148-50.
8. Id. But see Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 493 (3d Cir. 2001).
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II. OVERVIEW OF WARN, ITS HISTORY, AND ITS REQUIREMENTS
A. The Legislative History and Circumstances Surrounding the
Enactment of WARN
On August 4, 1988, WARN became law.9 WARN was ground-
breaking because, when enacted, it became the first federal law re-
quiring large employers to provide advance notice of plant closings
and mass layoffs.10 Congress settled on a sixty-day notice require-
ment, reasoning that such advance notice would provide sufficient
time for workers, unions, and local and state governments to react to
worker displacement and layoffs."
At the time Congress enacted WARN, worker dislocation was a
major problem. The information from the Department of Labor's Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics (BLS) supports this fact; between 1981 and
1988, on average, 1.9 million adult workers (those 20 and older) lost
full-time jobs (1) because their employers closed or relocated, (2) be-
cause their position or shift was eliminated, or (3) because of slack
work. 12 Moreover, during this eight-year period, the data indicates
that each year, 830,000 to 1,060,000 workers were displaced because of
plant closings alone.13 In addition to the staunch number of employee
layoffs, the evidence indicates that worker displacements create nega-
tive public health effects.14 These substantial health risks demonstrate
the need for advance notification of mass layoffs and plant closings,
and they illustrate why Congress adopted WARN. Accordingly, one
central purpose of Congress enacting WARN was to curb these nega-
tive health effects that could potentially destroy communities and
their families.
Before settling on requiring advance notification, some legislators,
seeing the gravity of the problems associated with mass layoffs and
plant closings, proposed alternative solutions to prevent these
9. See Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988)).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 100-285, at 2-8 (1987).
11. H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 1 (1988) (Conf. Rep.) ("[A]dvance notice is an essential compo-
nent of a successful worker readjustment program . . ..").
12. Richard W. McHugh, Fair Warning or Foul? An Analysis of the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification (WARN) Act in Practice, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4 (1993).
13. Id. at 4-5.
14. Id. at 5 (citing to M. Harvey Brenner, Economy, Society and Health (paper prepared for
the Conference on Society and Health, New England Medical Center, Boston, MA, Oct. 16,
1992) (finding a statistical relationship between increased unemployment and overall mortality,
heart attacks, suicide, homicide, arrests, incarcerations, and mental hospital admissions)).
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problems.' 5 Legislators proposed all of the following: "(1) providing
technical and financial assistance to troubled firms and affected com-
munities; (2) requiring advance consultation with unions and local
governments; (3) requiring disclosure of financial data; and (4) provid-
ing adjustment assistance and training for workers, in conjunction
with a considerable period of advance notice."16 The legislators who
supported legislative plant closings eventually came together and fo-
cused their efforts on promoting the issue of advance notice for
worker dislocations.'7
In October 1985, Labor Secretary William Brock appointed a Task
Force on Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation to evaluate
and study evidence regarding possible effects of advance notice legis-
lation.'8 After extensive collecting and evaluating of data, the Task
Force concluded that "advance notification is an essential component
of a successful adjustment program."19 The Task Force Report further
noted that advance notice aided workers in seeking employment prior
to being laid off from their jobs.20 In particular, the Task Force looked
at the system already in place in Canada with regard to plant closings:
the Canadian system called for rapid response to plant closings and
layoffs. 21 The Task Force concluded that the Canadian model "ap-
peared to offer the highest degree of replicability for the United
States. "22
A second report helped gain supporters for WARN. That report
came from the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA). 23 The OTA examined when to start projects for displaced
workers. In the report, the OTA found that the "best time to start a
project for displaced workers is before a plant closes or mass layoffs
begin; advance notice makes early action possible .... ."24 The OTA
report turned out to be a great asset for the supporters of WARN
because it disposed of two central arguments used by critics: (1) that
15. See William D. Ford, Plant Closing Legislation, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 1219-31 (1983); Jo-
seph A. Cipparone, Advance Notice of Plant Closings: Toward National Legislation, 14 MICH.
J.L. REFORM 283-316 (1981).
16. McHugh, supra note 12, at 7.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 8.
19. Id.(quoting U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND WORKER DISLOCATION
IN A COMPETITIVE SOCIETY: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR'S TASK FORCE ON Eco-
NOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND WORKER DISLOCATION 1, at 22-23 (1986)).
20. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 19, at 20.
21. McHugh, supra note 12, at 9.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 100-285, at 13 (1987.
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after receiving notice of a plant closing a worker will cause problems
or lower productivity;25 and (2) that there would be problems comply-
ing with the notification requirements. 26
The last significant report was performed by the General Account-
ing Office (GAO). 27 The GAO's report illustrated the widespread
practice of large firms and factories not giving advance notice to their
workers. It demonstrated that 32% of firms gave no notice of plant
closings or mass layoffs and that an astonishing 81% of firms gave
thirty days' or less notice. 28 This report further indicates that if fac-
tory and large firm owners are not mandated to give extensive ad-
vance notice, they will choose not to do so at the expense of their
workers. This gave policymakers and other WARN supporters the ev-
idence necessary to show Congress that it needed to step in and pass a
law to avoid or reduce the period of dislocation between jobs and the
negative health effects associated with this displacement.
The abundance of information surrounding the events leading up to
WARN's enactment illustrates the strong public interest in deterring
large layoffs and plant closings, as well as in providing workers in
these large plants and factories enough notice to recover from the
problems associated with these firings. This information and data set
the stage for WARN's enactment and further demonstrate the stat-
ute's significance. Moreover, the information and data illustrate the
overall importance of clearly defining an "employer" in the context of
a debtor and secured creditor relationship under WARN.
B. General Background and Purposes of WARN
The late Senator Ted Kennedy stated several purposes in support of
WARN, the first one being that "advance notice is essential to the
successful adjustment of workers to the job loss caused by changing
economic conditions. . . . An advance notice provision ensures that
large numbers of workers will not be displaced without warning and
without planning." 29 His final purpose, "and perhaps most important,
[asserted that] an advance notice requirement assures fair play for
American workers." 30 Congress believed that WARN would provide
necessary protection to employees and their families from the set-
25. H.R. REP. No. 100-285, at 22.
26. H.R. REP. No. 100-285, at 38-40.
27. GENERAL ACCouNTINGc OFFICE, PLANT CLOSINGS: LIMITED ADVANCE NOTICE AND As-
SISTANCE PROVIDED DISLOCATED WORKERS, H.R. Doc. No. 87-105 (1987).
28. Id. at 78; Sharon P. Brown, How Often Do Workers Receive Advance Notice of Layoffs?,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1987, at 13, 14-15.
29. 134 CONG. REC. S8374, at 5 (daily ed. June 22, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
30. Id.
2009]1 87
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backs of situations where employers gave no notice of layoffs or even
sometimes concealed these layoffs or closings from the employees;
"It]he thrust of WARN is to give fair warning in advance of prospec-
tive plant closings." 31
With some exceptions, WARN forbids an employer to "order a
plant closing or mass layoff until the end of a 60-day period after the
employer serves written notice of such an order."32 Section 2104
states that "[a]ny employer who orders a plant closing or mass layoff
in violation of [the notice requirements of] section 2102" is liable to
affected employees for back pay up to a maximum of sixty days of
work plus benefits.3 3 A "mass layoff" is any other work force reduc-
tion that results in an "employment loss" for either (1) 50 to 499 full-
time employees, if the number laid off equals thirty-three percent of
the work force; or (2) 500 full-time employees. 34 Before the penalty
provided by WARN applies, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendant is an "employer" responsible for the employment loss.35
For purposes of WARN, the term "employer" is defined as "any
business enterprise that employs (A) 100 or more employees, exclud-
ing part-time employees; or (B) 100 or more employees who in the
aggregate work at least 4,000 hours per week (exclusive of hours of
overtime)." 36 "The simplicity of the definition emphasizes its appar-
ent breath" but still divides courts regarding the best test to define
"employer" in the context of the debtor and secured creditor relation-
ship.37 Courts often disagree on statutory interpretation, and the pre-
sent situation is no exception. Several courts of appeals have explored
the issue of which test to apply when deciding whether a secured cred-
itor is an "employer" under WARN, but as previously stated, there
presently is a circuit split.38
31. Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Elsinore Shore Ass'n, 173
F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1999); see 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (1998).
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (2000).
33. Coppola v. Bear Sterns & Co., 499 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 2104(a)(1) (2000)).
34. See § 2101(a)(3) .
35. See § 2102(a).
36. See § 2101(a)(1).
37. See Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 572 v. Weslock
Corp., 66 F.3d 241, 244 (9th Cir. 1995). But see Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471,
493 (3d. Cir. 2001).
38. See Weslock, 66 F.3d at 244.
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III. THE COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE MEANING OF
"EMPLOYER" UNDER WARN
Four circuits have addressed the liability of a creditor under WARN
for the plant closing or mass layoff of its borrower. 39 However, in
these circumstances, these circuits are split over how to define, and
who is, an "employer" under WARN.
The test used by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, and recently
adopted by the Second Circuit, is "whether, at the time of the plant
closing, the creditor was in fact 'responsible for operating the business
as a going concern"' and "'preserv[ing] the business asset for liquida-
tion or sale.'"40 This test is consistent with the traditional principles of
lender liability.41 The essential part of the inquiry is whether the cred-
itor has joined in or assumed control of the borrower's business as a
going concern, rather than as a means to protect its security for repay-
ment. In Coppola, the court noted that the test "accords with tradi-
tional principles of lender liability." 42 "Under those principles, a
creditor that has not assumed the formal indicia of ownership may
become liable for the debts of its borrower if the lender's conduct is
such as to cause it to become the debtor's agent, partner, or alter
ego."43
The Third Circuit adopted a different test in Pearson v. Component
Technology Corporation.44 In Pearson, the court believed that a
'more targeted inquiry" than that found in general lender liability
cases was appropriate in the WARN context.45 The Pearson court
adopted factors identified by the Department of Labor as relevant to
whether, for the purposes of WARN, independent contractors and
subsidiaries are treated as separate employers or as a part of the par-
ent contracting company, as an appropriate method of determining
lender liability as well as parent liability. 46 These factors include "(i)
common ownership, (ii) common directors and/or officers, (iii) de
39. See Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., 499 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2007); Pearson v. Component
Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 493 (3d. Cir. 2001); Adams v. Erwin Weller Co., 87 F.3d 269 (8th Cir.
1996); Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 572 v. Weslock Corp.,
66 F.3d 241 (9th Cir. 1995).
40. Coppola, 499 F.3d at 148 (quoting Weslock, 66 F.3d at 244); see also Adams, 87 F.3d at 272
(stating "[o]nly when a lender becomes so entangled with its borrower that it has assumed re-
sponsibility for the overall management of the borrower's business will the degree of control
necessary to support employer responsibility under WARN be achieved").
41. See Coppola, 499 F.3d at 148.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. See Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 493 (3d Cir. 2001).
45. Id.
46. See id. at 494-95.
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facto exercise of control, (iv) unity of personnel policies emanating
from a common source, and (v) the dependency of operations." 47 The
court noted that this list of factors is nonexhaustive, reminding the
trier of fact that the inquiry is a balancing test.48
IV. OVERVIEW OF PRINCIPLES OF LENDER LIABILITY
Traditional principles of lender liability influenced the majority of
courts' decisions in implementing the majority test. The following
cases were cited by the court in A. Gay Jenson Farms Company v.
Cargill and give a general background of lender liability in cases
where the lender became the debtor's agent, partner, and alter ego.
In each of the following theories, an essential part of the inquiry is
"whether the creditor has joined in or assumed control of the bor-
rower's business as a going concern rather than as a means to protect
its security for repayment." 49
A. Agency Relationship: A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc.,
309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981)
This case stemmed from the financial collapse of defendant Warren
Seed & Grain ("Warren"), and "its failure to satisfy its indebtedness
to plaintiffs." 0 Warren operated a grain elevator and was involved
with purchasing cash or market grain from local farmers.51 Warren
applied for financing from Cargill in 1964.52 Cargill's officials investi-
gated Warren's operations and recommended that Cargill finance
Warren. 53 The major issue in Cargill was "whether Cargill, by its
course of dealing with Warren, became liable as a principal on con-
tracts made by Warren with plaintiffs." 54 Cargill claimed that "no
agency relationship was established with Warren, notwithstanding its
financing of Warren's operation and its purchase of the majority of
Warren's grain."55 However, the court found that Cargill's control
and influence over Warren turned Cargill into a principal with liability
47. 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2) (1998).
48. See Pearson, 247 F.3d at 490.
49. See Coppola v. Bear Sterns & Co., 499 F.3d 144, 148-49 (2d Cir. 2007).
50. A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Minn. 1981).
51. Id..
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 290.
55. Cargill, 309 N.W.2d at 290.
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for the transactions entered into by its agent Warren. 56 Therefore, the
court concluded that an agency relationship existed.57
The Cargill court noted that a creditor that has not assumed the
formal indicia of ownership may become liable for the debts of its
borrower if the lender's conduct is such as to cause it to become the
debtor's agent.58 First, a creditor who assumes control of his debtor's
business may become liable as a principal for the acts of the debtor in
connection with the business.59 A creditor becomes a principal when
he assumes de facto control over the conduct of his debtor, despite
what the terms of the formal contract state.60 In Cargill, the court
found that Cargill was more than simply a financier; it was an active
participant in the debtor's operations. 61 Lastly, the court found, and
Cargill agreed, that Cargill and Warren had a "paternalistic relation-
ship in which Cargill made the key economic decisions and kept War-
ren in existence." 62 The court concluded that there was a "unique
fabric in the relationship between Cargill and Warren which varies
from that found in normal debtor-creditor situations." 63
B. Partnership Relationship: Martin v. Peyton,
158 N.E. 77 (N.Y 1927)
In Martin, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants became part-
ners in a firm doing business as bankers and brokers." Because an
actual partnership was claimed, the court referred to circumstances
surrounding certain documents' execution. 65 The Martin court ruled
in favor of lender Defendants and described the issue as "whether in
fact [the lender defendants] agree[d] to so associate themselves with
56. Id. (The court listed many factors indicating Cargill's control over Warren: "(1) Cargill's
constant recommendations to Warren by telephone; (2) Cargill's right of first refusal on grain;
(3) Warren's inability to enter into mortgages, to purchase stock or to pay dividends without
Cargill's approval; (4) Cargill's right of entry onto Warren's premises to carry on periodic checks
and audits; (5) Cargill's correspondence and criticism regarding Warren's finances, officers sala-
ries and inventory; (6) Cargill's determination that Warren needed "strong paternal guidance";
(7) Provision of drafts and forms to Warren upon which Cargill's name was imprinted; (8) Fi-
nancing of all Warren's purchases of grain and operating expenses; and (9) Cargill's power to
discontinue the financing of Warren's operations.") Id. at 291.
57. Id. at 291.
58. Cargill, 309 N.W.2d at 292-93.
59. See id. at 293.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 292.
62. Cargill, 309 N.W.2d at 292-93.
63. Id. at 293.
64. Martin v. Peyton, 158 N.E. 77, 78 (N.Y. 1927)
65. Id.
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the firm as to 'carry on as co-owners a business for profit." 66 The
Martin court noted that a creditor may become liable for the debts of
a borrower because the lender's conduct may lead a court to conclude
that the lender was the debtor's partner.67 The court used partnership
rules to conclude, however, that no implied partnership existed be-
tween the creditor and the debtor, despite the fact that the lender im-
posed a complex set of arrangements giving them substantial control
over the firm and its principals. 68 The court reasoned that the credi-
tor's precautionary measures taken to safeguard the loan were "ordi-
nary caution" and did not imply an association in the business.69
C. Alter Ego Relationship: Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat'l
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973)
The Krivos case stands for the proposition that a creditor may be-
come liable for the debts of its borrower if the lender's conduct estab-
lishes that the lender is the debtor's alter ego.70 Here, the creditors
sued the corporation to recover debt from their subservient corpora-
tion, alleging that liability was predicated upon the rule that when one
corporation controls and dominates another corporation to the extent
that the second corporation becomes the mere instrumentality of the
first, the dominant corporation becomes liable for all of those debts of
the subservient corporation attributable to an abuse of that control.71
The court concluded that the evidence was "not of such quality and
weight that reasonable and fairminded [sic] men in the exercise of im-
partial judgment might reach different conclusions." 7 2 Here, the cred-
itor needed to show "actual, operative, [and] total control of the
subservient corporation."73 The court concluded that the evidence
failed to show that the debtor corporation had "no separate mind, will
or existence of its own and [was] but a business conduit" for the de-
fendant; therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.74
These cases set the stage for the majority test. In each of the previ-
ous cases, the creditors avoided liability where they could show that
they possessed no more control than necessary to secure repayment of
66. Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., 499 F.3d 144, 149 (2d. Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin, 158
N.E. at 79-80).
67. Martin, 158 N.E. at 78-79.
68. Id. at 80.
69. Id. at 79.
70. Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973).
71. Id. at 1110.
72. Id. at 1109.
73. Id.
74. Id.
[Vol. 8:83
WHO IS AN EMPLOYER UNDER WARN?
their loan to the debtor. This is the framework that sets the stage for
the majority test, its reasoning, and its benefits, all of which are dis-
cussed below.
V. CASES AND ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Test
As previously mentioned in this article, the Second, Eight, and
Ninth Circuits have explicitly examined the issue of who is an "em-
ployer" under WARN in the arena of debtor-creditor relationships,
and they have come to form the majority test among the circuits.75
This majority believes that the central inquiry should be "whether, at
the time of the plant closing, the creditor was in fact 'responsible for
operating the business as a going concern' and 'preserv[ing] the busi-
ness asset for liquidation or sale." 76 It is important to become famil-
iar with each of these three cases to gain a better understanding of the
methodology behind the majority test as well as its bounds. The Cop-
pola case will be discussed first because it is the most recent of the
three decisions and because of its extensive analysis may be consid-
ered the most persuasive. The Coppola court incorporates the reason-
ing and analysis of the prior decisions rendered by the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits. These prior cases are discussed following an analysis
of the Coppola decision.
1. Coppola v. Bears Stearns and Company77
Bear Stearns (creditor) was providing National Finance Corpora-
tion (employer/debtor, hereinafter referred to as "NFC") some fi-
nancing in connection with certain deals even though this company
had earlier defrauded Bear Stearns in order to collect money that
NFC owed Bear Stearns.78 The court concluded that Bear Stearns
was not an employer under this statute.79 Bears Stearns was not itself
an "employer" within the meaning of WARN, and thus, it was not
liable to employees when the NFC's principal offices were closed
without warning. Bear Stearn's conduct of temporarily taking over
NFC's failing business, installing a manager at NFC's headquarters,
75. See generally Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., 499 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2007); Adams v. Erwin
Weller Co., 87 F.3d 269, 271 (8th Cir. 1996); Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers, Warehousemen & Help-
ers Union Local 572 v.Weslock Corp., 66 F.3d 241 (9th Cir. 1995).
76. Coppola, 499 F.3d at 148 (quoting Weslock, 66 F.3d at 244); see also Adams, 87 F.3d at
272.
77. Coppola v. Bear Stearns & co., 499 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2007).
78. See Coppola, 499 F.3d at 146.
79. See id. at 151.
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and firing and replacing NFC's officers, was done for the purpose of
salvaging NFC's business for the short term in order to facilitate the
sale of the business and recovery of Bear Stearns' $5.6 million in
loans.80 Further, Bear Stearns took no long-term interest in the oper-
ation of NFC as a business.81
The court in Coppola applied a test in line with the legislative his-
tory of and congressional intent behind WARN.8 2 "Congress foresaw
that WARN liability and the needs of a capital-starved business might
be inconsistent and provided a defense for employers where giving
timely notice would have impaired an employer's active efforts to ob-
tain capital that would eliminate the need for a shutdown."8 3 The
court in Coppola aptly recognized that Congress did not intend for
creditors, there to aid failing businesses, to submit to WARN liability
when acting simply as a creditor.84 This likely includes creditors who
exercise substantial control over the debtor, not surprisingly, because
they want to protect their investment. As stated in Coppola, "Con-
gress could hardly have also intended an expanded definition of em-
ployer that would impose WARN liability on lenders who seek
appropriate protective controls on borrower behavior."8 5 Further, the
court recognized that WARN was enacted to protect employees. 86
Therefore, protecting creditors who try to keep these businesses and
factories from closing is one way to further this purpose; this test, ac-
cording to the court, furthers this objective.87 The court recognized
that if Bear Stearns believed it was to be subject to liability under
WARN, it likely would have walked away from the venture in 1999,
which would most likely have meant a business closure for the debtor
company, NFC.88
While the court seems to lessen the potential for creditor liability
under WARN, it does not create a full exemption for all creditors. A
creditor who exercises control over a debtor beyond that necessary to
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 150.
83. Coppola, 499 F.3d at 150-51; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(1) (2000) ("An employer may
order the shutdown of a single site of employment before the conclusion of the 60-day period if
as of the time that notice would have been required the employer was actively seeking capital or
business which, if obtained, would have enabled the employer to avoid or postpone the shut-
down and the employer reasonably and in good faith believed that giving the notice required
would have precluded the employer from obtaining the needed capital or business").
84. Coppola, 499 F.3d at 150-51.
85. Coppola, 499 F.3d at 151.
86. See generally id. at 147-50.
87. See id.
88. Id.
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recoup some or all of what is owed and is operating the debtor as the
de facto owner of an ongoing business is liable under WARN. This
test grants the creditor substantial leeway to exercise control in order
to secure its money owed, but the test also instructs the creditor not to
implement so much control as is unnecessary. In the situation where
the creditor exercises excess control, the creditor is no longer simply
acting like a creditor; now, the creditor is acting like an employer.
Accordingly, the purposes of the statute are furthered by subjecting
the creditor to liability. Also, this test does not discourage creditors
from pursuing future ventures because the test allows creditors to ex-
ercise as much control as necessary to recoup the money owed. How-
ever, it is precisely when the creditor goes beyond protecting its
interest that the creditor becomes subject to WARN liability.8 9
2. Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Union
Local 572 v. Weslock Corporation90
In Weslock, a secured creditor whose interaction with a delinquent
debtor was primarily limited to financial controls was declared not to
be an employer under WARN.91 In Weslock, the creditor agreed to
lend working capital to a manufacturing plant. 92 There was no indica-
tion that the creditor participated in decisions concerning plant pro-
duction, marketing, or employment practices. 93 The creditor did
maintain an ongoing involvement in the debtor's financial problems,
but the court concluded that this type of control (over financial mat-
ters) was consistent with the type a secured creditor may exercise over
a defaulting debtor to protect collateral securing a loan.94 The court
stated that "where the creditor does no more than exercise that de-
gree of control over the debtor's collateral necessary to protect the
security interest, and acts only to preserve the business asset for liqui-
dation or sale, the notice requirement of WARN will not apply 'pre-
cisely because the [creditor has not] continue[d] the business in
operation." 95 The court looked to the Department of Labor's final
regulations to help determine WARN's scope:
Although the regulations do not directly address a situation where a
secured creditor takes possession of a debtor's business assets, the
89. Id.
90. Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 572 v. Weslock Corp.,
66 F.3d 241 (9th Cir. 1995).
91. Weslock, 66 F.3d at 245.
92. Id. at 242.
93. See id. at 242-43.
94. Id. at 245.
95. Id. at 244 (quoting 54 Fed. Reg. 16,045 (April 20, 1989)).
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comments acknowledge that the application of WARN to a "fiduci-
ary" . . . in a bankruptcy proceeding is dependent on whether the
fiduciary has in fact operated the debtor's assets as a business enter-
prise . . . .96
Further, the court concluded that without some evidence showing the
lender's involvement in the functional operations of the facility,
"there can be no finding that [the lender] is an employer under
WARN." 97 It noted that defining "employer" under WARN is not
dissimilar to defining a fiduciary under bankruptcy proceedings. 98
Therefore, under the court's reasoning, a creditor must go beyond ex-
ercising that degree of control over the debtor's collateral necessary to
protect his security interest. Accordingly, the court held that the cred-
itor was not an employer for the purposes of WARN.99
Once again, this reasoning is consistent with the purpose of WARN
because the purpose of the statute was to help reduce the number of
displaced workers and lower the unemployment period for workers
who did lose their jobs by requiring advance notice. The majority test
encourages creditors to issue credit freely, while still vigorously pro-
tecting their financial interest without being subject to liability under
WARN. Further, the test explicitly grants creditors the ability to exer-
cise substantial financial control to secure their debt when the debtor
finds itself in financial trouble. The upshot of more freely given credit
is that more factories will stay in business and will be given a chance
to survive because more creditors will be willing to offer credit. It
seems intuitive that a creditor would be more apt to lend if it knew it
had leeway to control and protect its investment. Moreover, this will
likely lead to less mass layoffs of employees. Therefore, the majority
test for defining an employer under WARN in creditor-debtor rela-
tionships furthers the congressional intent of WARN.
3. Adams v. Erwin Weller Company'00
In Adams, the court asked the question "whether a lender's involve-
ment with its borrower's business affairs makes the lender an em-
96. Weslock, 66 F.3d at 244.
97. Id. at 245.
98. Id. at 244 ("DOL agrees that a fiduciary whose sole function in the bankruptcy process is
to liquidate a failed business for the benefit of creditors does not succeed to the notice obliga-
tions of the former employer because the fiduciary is not operating a 'business enterprise' in the
normal commercial sense. In other situations, where the fiduciary may continue to operate the
business for the benefit of creditors, the fiduciary would succeed to the WARN obligations of the
employer precisely because the fiduciary continues the business in operation.") Id. (quoting 54
Fed. Reg. 16,042 (1999)).
99. See id. at 245.
100. Adams v. Erwin Weller Co., 87 F.3d 269, 271 (8th Cir. 1996).
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ployer under [WARN]." 10 1 In Adams, the commercial lender,
Westinghouse Credit Corporation ("WCC"), made a series of secured
loans to the debtor, Erwin Weller Company ("EWC"). 102 From the
beginning, EWC experienced financial problems and nothing worked
to reverse its financial fortunes.103 WCC refused to furnish additional
credit, and eventually, EWC closed its plant without giving its employ-
ees any advance notice.104 The discharged employees brought suit,
alleging that WCC was their employer at the time of the plant closing
and that it had violated WARN.105
The court, pursuant to WARN, analyzed the issue of whether WCC
was an employer for purposes of determining liability. First, it noted
the mere fact that the loan documents gave some control over the
borrower to protect the lender's security interest did not automatically
make the lender an employer under WARN. 106 Further, citing Wes-
lock, it concluded that "only when a lender becomes so entangled with
its borrower that it has assumed responsibility for the overall manage-
ment of the borrower's business will the degree of control necessary to
support employer responsibility under WARN be achieved."107 A
lender only becomes an employer under WARN "[when] the [lender]
operates the [borrower's] asset[s] as a 'business enterprise' in the nor-
mal commercial sense."108 In Adams, WCC dominated EWC's finan-
cial affairs, management, and business functions in the following ways:
(1) placing various restrictions in the loan documents; (2) maintaining
a security interest in EWC's assets; (3) maintaining a lockbox arrange-
ment for EWC's cash receivables; and (4) monitoring EWC's assets,
inventory, and expenditures and banned changes in EWC's capital
structure.109 The court concluded that WCC was not an employer for
purposes of WARN, despite its use of financial leverage to protect
security interest, as WCC never operated EWC's plant as a business
enterprise in the normal commercial sense.110 WCC and EWC's rela-
tionship was no more than a debtor-creditor relationship.111
The court's conclusion that WCC was not an employer for the pur-
poses of WARN again demonstrates the benefits of the majority test.
101. Adams, 87 F.3d at 271.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Adams, 87 F.3d at 271.
107. Id. at 272.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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The employees could not point to any facts that illustrated that WCC
was anything more than a "major lender[] attempt[ing] to work with a
troubled borrower and nurse it back to financial health."112 This fur-
thers the notion that the majority test reinforces creditor confidence
when issuing credit, allowing creditors to exert enough control to pro-
tect their financial interest without subjecting them to WARN liabil-
ity. As the court appropriately stated, "WCC"s position as . . . [a]
financial life-line undoubtedly gave it the capacity to exert influence
over EWC's decisions."1 13 This is precisely the type of control nor-
mally allowed under debtor-creditor relationships and should lead to
liability and constitute "decision-making control" under WARN's em-
ployer rule. 114 Creditors should not have to "timidly sit on the side-
lines" and watch their loan disintegrate or otherwise subject
themselves to WARN liability.115 The majority test assures the credi-
tor adequate protection.
B. The Minority Test
The minority test, employed by the Third Circuit, states that a court
should look to several factors when deciding who is an employer
under WARN. 116 These factors include (1) common ownership, (2)
common directors and/or officers, (3) de facto exercise of control, (4)
unity of personnel policies emanating from a common source, and (5)
the dependency of operations.117 The test is further discussed in the
following analysis of the Pearson decision.
1. Pearson v. Component Technology Corporation""s
Pearson caused the initial circuit split because it applied a different
test to define an employer under WARN when dealing with a transac-
tion between a debtor and a secured creditor.' 19 In Pearson, the Third
Circuit held that a secured creditor was not liable under WARN for
the employer's unnoticed plant closure.120 The test for determining
whether an employer's secured creditor was liable under WARN for
the employer's unnoticed plant closure was the multi-factored test
112. Adams, 87 F.3d at 272.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 495 (3d Cir. 2001).
117. 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2) (1998).
118. Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 495 (3d Cir. 2001).
119. Id. at 496-97.
120. See id. at 506.
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promulgated pursuant to WARN by the Department of Labor. 121' The
creditor was held not liable, even though it may have monitored much
of the employer's activity. 122 At all times, the employer remained "an
entirely separate business entity that did not rely on the creditor to
supply it with personnel, equipment, facilities, clients, administrative
services, or any of the other various resources typically 'shared' be-
tween companies that are ultimately found liable for each others'
debts." 123 In Pearson, the court reasoned that "by directing courts to
examine these particular factors, the Department of Labor was high-
lighting those aspects of corporate functioning that are most closely
tied to the particular problems the WARN Act was intended to
address." 124
The Pearson court looked at the legislative history and stated that
WARN was enacted to protect workers. 125 Further, the court recog-
nized the need for a test that is both workable and predictable. 126 The
court decided to settle on the Department of Labor's factors because
they were created with WARN policies in mind. However, while
these factors may further legislative purpose, they do not bring the
predictability the court hoped for when applying these factors. The
court's test requires a balancing of the factors in order to decide
whether the creditor is subject to liability under WARN.127 A balanc-
ing of a myriad of factors (these five factors are illustrative, not ex-
haustive1 28) creates almost no predictability for a creditor looking to
partake in a future business venture. Further, this uncertainty would
likely discourage creditors from taking business risks because of a real
fear that it would be subject to liability under WARN. Thus, capital-
starved businesses would be left with access to fewer creditors. There-
fore, after a deeper evaluation of the test, this test may actually under-
mine the purpose of WARN. Less available creditors for failing
businesses would lead to more mass layoffs and plant closings, likely
without sufficient notice required under WARN.129 Accordingly, the
people the statute seeks to protect, employees and their families, may
be the group hurt most by an unpredictable and inconsistent test such
121. See id. at 495-506.
122. See id. at 506.
123. Id. at 505.
124. Pearson, 247 F.3d at 493.
125. Id. at 488.
126. See id. at 489-90.
127. See id. at 490.
128. See id.
129. See Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., 499 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2007)..
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as this one. Further, the fact that judges are given a non-exhaustive
list of factors substantially advances notions of unpredictability.
The Third Circuit attempts to further the purpose of WARN, but
the means it uses to get there need to be refined and more narrowly
tailored. The court recognizes that creditors should be liable as an
employer under WARN where the lenders so control the borrowing
corporation that the corporation is functionally being run by the lend-
ers, or solely for the lenders' benefit. 30 However, unlike the court in
Coppola, the Pearson court does not address the fact that some credi-
tors need this control in order to protect their investment. Thus, as
previously stated, this would deter creditors from partaking in ven-
tures necessary for failing companies solely because a court following
this minority test will apply factors similar to those of "piercing the
corporate veil" in order to determine liability. Numerous legal schol-
ars have written about the unpredictability present when courts ad-
dress the issue of whether the corporate veil has been pierced and the
ad hoc nature of its application.' 3 ' Because this minority test uses
these factors to determine who is an "employer" for the purposes of
WARN, this test's applications would result in the same murkiness.
Accordingly, the test's shortcomings may ultimately lead to harming
laid-off employees and their families.
2. The Murky Waters of Piercing the Corporate Veil
As previously stated, courts have had an exceedingly difficult time
determining whether the corporate veil has been pierced. Under the
veil-piercing test, courts must determine whether a corporation has a
"separate mind of its own."132 One prominent legal scholar candidly
states that the "arbitrariness of these nominal tests casts further doubt
on the utility of the [piercing the corporate veil] doctrine." 33 Further,
the "laundry list" of factors for courts to consider also makes it, as
mentioned above, exceedingly difficult to predict when courts will
pierce the veil.134 Thus, in the present situation under WARN, the
130. See Pearson, 247 F.3d at 491.
131. See Frank E. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52
U. CHi. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985) (stating "[tihere is a consensus that the whole area of limited
liability, and conversely of piercing the corporate veil, is among the most confusing in corporate
law"); see also Carsten Alting, Piercing the Corporate Veil in American and German Law -
Liability of Individuals and Entities: A Comparative View, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 187, 250
(1995) (describing veil piercing as producing "unpredictable and random decisions").
132. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 125, at 109.
133. Id.
134. David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of
Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1330 (2007) (stating "[e]ven knowing [which factors are
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predictability that is so essential for creditors to know when deciding
whether to extend credit will be destroyed under the minority test.
Professor David Millon, in his law review article, put it best: "[tihe
unweighted laundry list method, combined with the inherent vague-
ness of many of the items on the list, gives the cases an ad hoc, fluky
aspect."135 Further, when courts apply veil-piercing factors, "'results
often seem conclusory and based on the court's instinctive reaction to
the morality of the defendant's conduct." 3 6 The problem with this
type of ad hoc testing is obvious. How will a court define morality?
What is moral and just to one judge may be completely different to
another judge. Moreover, how is a company, or in this situation, a
creditor, supposed to act to ensure the veil-piercing factors do not de-
stroy the creditor's defense? The answer to that is relatively simple:
they cannot prepare for this because this test is subjective in nature.
The murky waters of piercing the corporate veil indicate the
problems with the minority test and illustrate why it should be dis-
carded. As scholars and courts have demonstrated, tests that incorpo-
rate a laundry list of factors, none dispositive, create unpredictability
and results that are often predicated on a judge's notion of fairness
and morality.13 7 Here, the minority test may be even cloudier than
the test used when piercing the corporate veil. For instance, the list of
factors is non-exhaustive. This leads to greater unpredictability be-
cause an endless list of factors gives judges carte blanche to rule in
whatever direction they believe is right, giving more subjectivity to an
already murky test.
Accordingly, judges should look at the problems courts and scholars
have encountered when dealing with the problem of piercing the cor-
porate veil, and they should discard this minority test in favor of the
majority's more predictable test. Only after achieving predictability
will creditors be able to make fully informed decisions to issue credit.
In turn, these informed decisions will trickle down and help prevent
displaced workers, which is one of the purposes of enacting WARN.
VI. SUMMING UP THE APPROACHES AND THE REPERCUSSIONS OF
BOTH TESTS
The majority test offers a better approach because the majority test
uses traditional principles of lender liability. The minority test, on the
most important to consider], it is still quite difficult to predict when courts will pierce the corpo-
rate veil and when not.").
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
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other hand, has little direct bearing on classic relationships between
lenders and borrowers.
The majority test furthers the legislative purpose and is consistent
with the text and policy of WARN.138 WARN was meant to prevent
employers from shutting down large plants with a substantial number
of employers to stop potential community-wide employment crisis.
Creditors are seldom referred to as "employer" so courts need to be
careful when applying tests that could place them in the category of
employers and subject them to liability under WARN. If a court's test
is too easily applicable to large creditors, creditors will be reluctant to
workout. 139 The Coppola court recognized this concern; it realized
that the policy of WARN would be "turned on its head" by a test
similar to the minority tests, which imposed liability under WARN
based on the exercise of control by creditors during a workout.140
WARN's purpose is to cushion the blow to workers of mass layoffs or
factory closings by requiring sixty days' notice by the employer. If
liability under WARN hinges on an exercise of control, creditors can-
not undertake projects that require an exercise of control without a
significant risk of subjecting itself to liability. This could lead to fewer
workouts and more business closures, many without the required
WARN notice.141 Many times the exercise of control is essential to
persuade creditors to agree and to attempt a workout.142 Accordingly,
the minority test could undermine the purpose of the statute.
The majority test gives courts and creditors predictability to make
the decision of whether to provide credit. If the creditor can prove
that it needed to exercise the present amount of control in order to
recover the money owed, then the creditor will be free from WARN's
clutches.143 Conversely, if the creditor goes beyond the necessary con-
trol, the creditor will be subject to liability. While a court using this
test may look at factors like commonality of ownership or dependency
of operations, the central inquiry always remains "whether a creditor
is exercising control over the debtor beyond that necessary to recoup
some or all of what is owed."144 Thus, this approach grants a creditor
predictability as well as flexibility in the creditor's actions. Further,
creditors will be less fearful from engaging in business ventures if the
138. Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., 499 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2007).
139. See id.
140. Id. at 150. But see Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 487-91 (3d Cir.
2001).
141. Coppola, 499 F.3d at 150.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 150.
144. Id.
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majority rule is applied than if a test that fosters unpredictability to-
wards liability is used.
VII. SHOULD COURTS READ THE DEFINITION OF EMPLOYER
MORE BROADLY?
One question that may be posed when defining an "employer"
under WARN is whether courts should interpret who is an "em-
ployer" broadly. Looking at the legislative history, it is clear that the
major concern when enacting WARN was the harm suffered by dis-
placed workers as a result of mass layoffs and plant closings. There-
fore, at first thought, it may seem that the more advance notice the
better in every situation. However, this does not seem to be the case.
One must also look at this statute from the viewpoint of a creditor.
Earlier portions of this article discuss the deterrence creditors would
experience with a test that would produce uncertain and possibly vari-
able results. This likely would be the situation here, as well. If all
creditors believed that they would be within the grasp of WARN, they
might routinely decline to issue credit to employers with urgent finan-
cial difficulties, eventually leading to higher rates of company failures
and necessitating mass layoffs. Further, this would trickle down to the
employees because they would be laid off and sent searching for new
jobs without any advance notice. This would run opposite of Con-
gress's intent to help these unfortunate situations and the harms that
occur as a result.
Accordingly, the best result is not to expand the definition of em-
ployer to include nearly all creditors in creditor-debtor relationships,
but instead to implement a test that ensures predictability. As stated
earlier, predictability allows creditors to extend credit to failing com-
panies, while also knowing the consequences of their actions at the
time they extend credit. Further, it allows creditors to take enough
control as necessary to increase the likelihood of a profitable return,
or at least recoup the money invested.
VIII. CONCLUSION
WARN is arguably more important than it was when it was first
enacted in 1988. According to the United States Department of La-
bor, the national unemployment rate was 5.5% in 1988.145 Compare
that figure with the rates being expressed in the final third of 2009.
145. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bis.gov/web/cpseeal.pdf (last visited October
4, 2009).
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The unemployment rate reported in September of 2009 was 9.8%.146
To put that figure in perspective, in the last year in which the unem-
ployment rate was that high, September 1992, Bill Clinton was still
campaigning to be the forty-second President of the United States.147
This illustrates that worker layoffs and plant closings are as big a con-
cern now as they were at the time of WARN's enactment. Moreover,
the need to uniformly define the breadth of who is an "employer"
under WARN is essential to help curtail this unemployment and the
problems that can potentially ensue as a result.
The concerns present when legislators enacted WARN have not dis-
appeared. The state of the United States economy is on the minds of
every American citizen because of its exceedingly poor performance.
One of President Barack Obama's first accomplishments as President
was to pass an incredibly expensive and extensive stimulus bill ($787
billicn) to support the struggling economy, private citizens, and major
public corporations.148 Included in the corporations are major
automakers that employ thousands of people, all potentially losing
their jobs if these American automakers are not "bailed out." The
fact that factory workers, plant employees, and many other Americans
working in large facilities are being laid off brings WARN to center
stage. While the stimulus bill tries to keep factories afloat, mass lay-
offs are still a regular occurrence.149 With all of these plant closings
and mass layoffs, there are sure to be disputes between workers and
their "employers." Therefore, there is a necessity for courts to fully
define the scope of WARN and come to a consensus on its interpreta-
tion in terms of all of its provisions. Further, with the need for credi-
tors higher than ever due to a struggling economy, the need to define
the breadth of an "employer" under WARN in the arena of creditor-
debtor relationships becomes imperative. The majority test offers
predictability as well as the freedom to creditors to protect their own
financial interests. In contrast to the majority test, the minority test
muddies the water by giving judges subjective free reign to decide who
146. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/web/cpseeal.pdf (last visited October
4, 2009); see also Obama: New Jobless number a sobering reminder, http://www.google.coml
hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gWifx4pzOPIWhSxlXff9HlvuaO2AD9B35FMG1 (last visited
October 4, 2009).
147. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/web/cpseeal.pdf (last visited Oc-
tober 4, 2009).
148. Matthew Benjamin & Julianna Goldman, Obama's Economic Stimulus Bill Most Ambi-
tious Since Roosevelt, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 17, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=20601103&sid=AJHfW4awsaho&refer=us.
149. See Jeff Harrington, Layoffs a last resort no more, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009,
available at http://tampabay.com/news/business/article978573.ece.
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is an "employer" under the statute based on a judge's notions of mo-
rality and justice. Based on the aforementioned considerations, the
minority test should be discarded in favor of the majority test.

